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Quantum field theory and time machines
S. Krasnikov∗
Abstract
We analyze the “F-locality condition” (proposed by Kay to be a mathemati-
cal implementation of a philosophical bias related to the equivalence principle,
we call it the “GH-equivalence principle”), which is often used to build a gen-
eralization of quantum field theory to non-globally hyperbolic spacetimes. In
particular we argue that the theorem proved by Kay, Radzikowski, and Wald
to the effect that time machines with compactly generated Cauchy horizons
are incompatible with the F-locality condition actually does not support the
“chronology protection conjecture”, but rather testifies that the F-locality
condition must be modified or abandoned. We also show that this condition
imposes a severe restriction on the geometry of the world (it is just this re-
striction that comes into conflict with the existence of a time machine), which
does not follow from the above mentioned philosophical bias. So, one need
not sacrifice the GH-equivalence principle to “emend” the F-locality condi-
tion. As an example we consider a particular modification, the “MF-locality
condition”. The theory obtained by replacing the F-locality condition with
the MF-locality condition possesses a few attractive features. One of them is
that it is consistent with both locality and the existence of time machines.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years much progress has been achieved toward the development of a rigorous and
meaningful quantum field theory in curved background (semiclassical gravity). In particular,
in the framework of the “algebraic approach” (see [1] and references there) for globally
hyperbolic spacetimes a complete and self-consistent description was constructed of the real
scalar field obeying the Klein-Gordon equation
(−m2)φ = 0. (1)
However, there are non-globally hyperbolic spacetimes [e. g., the Kerr black hole or space-
times with a conical singularity (those are universes containing a cosmic string)] quantum
effects in which are of obvious interest. So it would be desirable to have a theory applicable
to such spacetimes as well. Unfortunately, global hyperbolicity plays a crucial role in the
above mentioned theory, which therefore cannot be straightforwardly extended to the gen-
eral case. The desired generalization has not been constructed so far, but a few “reasonable
candidates for minimal necessary conditions” [1] were considered, that is “statements which
begin with the phrase ‘Whatever else a quantum field theory (on a given non-globally hyper-
bolic spacetime) consists of, it should at least involve . . .’ ” [1]. The best-studied candidate
necessary condition is the “F-locality condition” proposed by Kay [2]. Its importance is in
that it turns out to be quite restrictive. In particular, a theorem was recently proved by
Kay, Radzikowski, and Wald , which says, roughly speaking, that the F-locality condition
cannot hold in a spacetime containing a time machine with the compactly generated Cauchy
horizon [1].
The present paper is devoted to the problem of how the F-locality condition can be
amended. The necessity of the amendments [revealed by the Kay-Radzikowski-Wald (KRW)
theorem] stems from the fact that
One cannot just forbid time machines!
It is about six years now that a mechanism which could “protect causality” [3] against time
machines is actively looked for. The driving force for this search is apparently the idea
that the existence of a time machine would defy the usual notion of free will. And this
would be the case indeed if we found a paradox (like that usually called “the grandfather
paradox”). For, suppose we found such a system and such its initial (that is fixed to the
past of the time machine creation) state that the equations governing its evolution have
no solution due to the nontrivial causal structure of the spacetime. We know that the
system being prepared in this state must evolve according just to those equations (to change
them we must have confessed that we overlooked some effects, which would have implied
that we simply built an improper model, but not found a paradox) and at the same time
we know that they have no solution. So we have to conclude that such an initial state
somehow cannot be realized, that is “. . . if there are closed timelike lines to the future of
a given spacelike hypersurface, the set of possible initial data for classical matter on that
hypersurface . . . [is] heavily constrained compared with the same local interactions were
embedded in a chronology-respecting spacetime” [4]. The dislike for such a contradiction
with “a simple notion of free will” [5] was so strong that Rama and Sen in [6], Visser in
[7], and in fact Hawking and Ellis in [5] proposed just to postulate the impossibility of time
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machines. Also a postulate prohibiting time machines is implicitly contained (as is shown
by the KRW theorem) in Kay’s F-locality condition (from now on by a “time machine” we
mean exclusively a time machine with the compactly generated Cauchy horizon). The irony
of the situation is that, while no paradoxes have been found so far [8], such postulates in the
absence of a mechanism that could enforce them lead to precisely the same constraints on
one’s will. Indeed, we know that there are initial conditions on the metric and the fields such
that, when they are fixed at a spacelike surface1, the Einstein equations coupled with the
equations of motion for these fields lead to the formation of a time machine. So if a postulate
forbids time machines we only can conclude either that (1) there are some (e. g., quantum)
effects which we have overlooked and which being taken into consideration always change
the equations of motion so that the time machine does not form, or that (2) such initial
conditions are somehow forbidden. Both possibilities were considered in the literature.
(1). A popular idea was that the vacuum polarization near a would-be Cauchy horizon
(when it is compactly generated) becomes so strong that its back-reaction on the metric
prevents the formation of the horizon. This idea, however, has never been embodied in
specific results. The vacuum polarization in spacetimes with a time machine was evaluated
for a few simplest cases [3,9,10]2 and it turned out that sometimes it diverges on the Cauchy
horizon and sometimes it does not (in the perfect analogy with, say, the Minkowski space).
So it is unlikely that this effect could always protect causality.
(2). It is possible that initial data leading to the formation of a time machine are forbidden
not by a restriction on our will, but simply by the fact that they require some unrealizable
conditions. It was shown [3], for example, that to create a time machine of a non-cosmological
nature (that is evolving from a non-compact Cauchy surface) one has to violate the Weak
energy condition (WEC) and a number of restrictions were found on such violations (see,
e. g., [11]). None of them, however, has been able to rule time machines out. Moreover,
recently a classical scenario for WEC violations was proposed [12].
Thus causality remains still unprotected and any postulate prohibiting time machines
without adducing a mechanism that enforces this prohibition raises the alternative of reject-
ing either the postulate, or the idea that whether one can perform an experiment does not
depend on whether causality still holds somewhere in the future.
In the case of the F-locality condition the alternatives at first glance seem equally
unattractive since this condition is based on the GH-equivalence principle (see Section III).
However a closer inspection shows that the F-locality condition does contain a strong arbi-
trary requirement (in Section IV we discuss this fundamental point in great detail). So one
can reconcile the GH-equivalence principle with quantum field theory in spacetimes with a
time machine by just abandoning this requirement. In doing so one still can use the GH-
equivalence principle in the theory. It is only necessary to find its another mathematical
1Actually, even on a part of the surface t = 0 of an “almost Minkowskian” space (cf. [3]).
2There are also papers where (for non simply connected time machines) different results based on
the “method of images” are obtained and discussed. This method, however, involves manipulations
with incurably ill-defined entities and generally allows one to obtain almost any result one wants
(see [10] for a detailed discussion).
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implementation. As an example we consider in Section V the “MF-locality condition”. An
important point is that while expressing the GH-equivalence principle (and seemingly doing
it more adequately than the F-locality condition), it does not forbid time machines. From
this we conclude in particular that, contrary to what was claimed in [1] and in a number of
succeeding papers, the KRW theorem does not at all “provide strong evidence in support of
Hawking’s chronology protection conjecture”. It rather rules out the F-locality condition.
II. GEOMETRICAL PRELIMINARIES
An important role in our discussion will be played by the notion of global hyperbolicity.
Globally hyperbolic (GH) spacetimes most adequately meet the concept of a “good” or
“usual” spacetime (the Minkowski spacetime, for example, is GH).
Definition 1. A subset N of a spacetime (M, g) is called globally hyperbolic if strong causal-
ity holds in N and for any points p, q ∈ N the set J+(p) ∩ J−(q) is compact and lies in
N .
Whether or not a neighborhood N ⊂M is GH is not determined exclusively by its geometry.
Due to the requirement that (J+(p) ∩ J−(q)) ⊂ N it may happen that N is not GH even
though (N, g N ) is GH when it is regarded as a spacetime in its own right. So to describe
the geometrical properties of a neighborhood proper we introduce a new3 notion:
Definition 2. We call a subset N of a spacetime (M, g) intrinsically globally hyperbolic if
(N, g N ) is a globally hyperbolic (GH) spacetime.
Clearly, whether a neighborhood N is an intrinsically GH neighborhood (IGHN) does not
depend on the geometry of M −N (in contrast to whether it is a GHN). To avoid confusion,
note that our notion of “global hyperbolicity” is that of [5] and differs from that in [1,2].
The latter corresponds to our “intrinsic global hyperbolicity”. For later use let us list a few
obvious properties of (intrinsically) globally hyperbolic neighborhoods [(I)GHNs]:
(GH1) An intersection of two (I)GHNs is an (I)GHN;
(GH2) Any GHN is an IGHN and an IGHN is a GHN iff it is causally convex (that is iff
no causal curve leaving the IGHN returns in it).
Thus, intrinsic global hyperbolicity is a weaker condition than global hyperbolicity. In
particular,
(GH3) For any point P ∈M and any its neighborhood V there exists an IGHN N : P ∈
N ⊂ V , while such a GHN exists if and only if strong causality holds in P .
Property (GH2) enables us to construct a simple and useful example of a connected IGH
but not a GH subset of the (3-dimensional) Minkowski space4.
3Connected IGH neighborhoods were called locally causal in [13].
4The existence of such a neighborhood was mentioned in [2] with reference to Penrose.
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FIG. 1. Construction of a “bad” set
Example: A “bad” set. Let V be the cube {xk ∈ (−4, 4)}. Consider the strip S ⊂ V
(see Fig. 1) given by the system
x0 = ϕ/2, ϕ ∈ [−pi, pi], ρ ∈ [1, 2], (2)
where ρ, ϕ are the polar coordinates on the plane x1, x2. There are causally connected
points on S and, in particular, there are points connected by null geodesics lying in V (or
null related in V , in terms of [1,2]). A simple calculation based on the fact that
A is spacelike whenever |A0/Ai| < 1 (3)
shows, however, that
v1, v2 ∈ S, v1 6= v2, v1 4 v2 ⇒ ϕ(v2)− ϕ(v1) > ϕ0 > pi.
So a causal curve can connect two points in S only if one of them lies above the plane
Φ ≡ {v| x0(v) = 0} and the other below Φ. Hence,
(a) All causal curves connecting points of S intersect the plane Φ.
Similarly, by simple though tiresome considerations one can show that
(b) There is a closed set Θ ⊂ Φ such that S ∩ Θ = ∅ and none of the causal curves from
S to S intersects Ψ ≡ Φ−Θ.
(For example, we can choose Ψ ≡ {v ∈ Φ| ρ(v) ∈ (0.8, 2.2), |ϕ(v)| < 0.1}.) Consider now
S as a subset of the spacetime M ′ ≡ M − Θ. Properties (a,b) ensure that S is a (closed)
achronal set and hence by Prop. 6.6.3 of [5] the interior B of its Cauchy domain in M ′ is a
GH subset of M ′. Thus by (GH2) B is an IGHN and not a GHN.
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Note that we have used the fact that M is the Minkowski space only in stating (3). It
can be easily seen, however, that within any neighborhood in any spacetime coordinates xi
can be found such that (3) holds in the cube {xk ∈ (−4, 4)}. So (being generalized to the
4-dimensional case) this example proves the following proposition:
Proposition 1. For any point p and any its neighborhood V such a connected IGHN B ⊂ V
of p and such a pair of null related in V points r, q ∈ B exist that r and q are not connected
by any causal curve lying in B.
III. F-LOCALITY
The algebraic approach to quantum field theory (below we cite only some basic points
that have to do with F-locality, for details see [1] and references therein) is based on the
notion of the “field algebra”, which is a ∗-algebra with identity I generated by polynomials
in “smeared fields” φ(f), where f ranges over the space D(M) of smooth real valued func-
tions compactly supported on M . The smeared fields φ(f) are just some abstract objects
(informally they can be understood as φ(f) =
∫
M
φ(x)f(x)
√−g d4x, where φ(x) is the “field
at a point” operator of the (non-rigorous) conventional QFT). A field algebra is defined by
the relations (for all f, h ∈ D(M) and for all pairs of real numbers a, b):
φ(f) = φ(f)∗, φ(af + bh) = aφ(f) + bφ(h), φ((−m2)f) = 0 (4)
(defining a “pre-field algebra”) and a relation fixing commutators [φ(f), φ(h)], which we
discuss in the following subsections.
Given a field algebra one can proceed to build a complete quantum theory of the free
scalar field by introducing the notion of states, postulating some properties for “physically
realistic” states and prescriptions for evaluating physical quantities (such as the renormalized
expectation value of the stress-energy tensor) for these states. We will not go into this
“second level” [2] of the theory.
A. The globally hyperbolic case
Definition 3. Let E be a subset of D(M)×D(M) and let △ be a functional on pairs f, h,
where f, h ∈ D(M) and (f, h) ∈ E . We shall call △ a bidistribution on E if it is separately
linear and continuous (with respect to topology of D(M)) in either variable.
To fix a commutator relation for the field algebra consider the Klein-Gordon equation (1)
given on an IGHN U . Let △ be its bidistributional solution, that is, a bidistribution on
D(U)×D(U) satisfying △((−m2)f, h) = △(f, (−m2)h) = 0 for all f, h ∈ D(U). Among
all such solutions there is a preferred one:
Definition 4. Let △A(R)U be the fundamental solutions of the inhomogeneous Klein-Gordon
equation on a neighborhood U satisfying the property:
△A(R)U (f, g) = 0 whenever supp f ∩ J∓(supp g, U) = ∅. (5)
Then we call a bidistributional solution of the homogeneous Klein-Gordon equation △U ≡
△AU −△RU the advanced minus retarded solution on U .
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It turns out that for any IGHN U , △U exists and is unique. So we complete the definition
of a “field algebra” by adding to (4) the following commutator relation:
[φ(f), φ(h)] = i△M (f, h)I. (6)
Which of the bidistributional solutions of equation (1) is the advanced minus retarded solu-
tion for a given region U is completely determined by the causal structure of U . This allows
one to prove the following important fact [2]:
The F-locality property (Form I). Every point p in a GH spacetime M has an intrinsi-
cally globally hyperbolic neighborhood Up such that for all f, h ∈ D(Up), relation (6) holds
with △M replaced by △Up.
We can also reformulate the F-locality property in a slightly different form by “gluing” all
these △Up into a single bidistribution △F .
Let △ be a bidistribution on E ⊃ D(U) × D(U). It induces a bidistribution △ U on
D(U)×D(U) by the rule
∀f, h ∈ D(U) △ U (f, h) ≡ △(f, h).
Definition 5. We shall call U and △ matching if U is a connected IGHN and
△ U = △U .
The F-locality property (Form II). There are such an open covering of a GH spacetime
M by IGHNs {Uα} and such a bidistribution △F on EU that
(Pr1) △F matches any Uα
(Pr2) When (f, h) ∈ EU , relation (6) holds with △M replaced by △F .
Here and subsequently if {Uα} is a set of neighborhoods in M we write EU for
⋃
α[D(Uα)×
D(Uα)].
B. The non-globally hyperbolic case
To build a field algebra in a non-globally hyperbolic spacetime we can start with a
“pre-field algebra” (4). Then, however, we meet a problem with the commutator relation
since △M is (uniquely) defined only for GH spacetimes and there are no obviously preferred
solutions of (1) any longer. So, we need some new postulate and Kay proposed [2] to
infer such a postulate from the equivalence principle, which as applied to our situation he
formulated as follows.
The GH-equivalence principle. On an arbitrary spacetime, the laws in the small should
coincide with the “usual laws for quantum field theory on globally hyperbolic spacetimes”.
From this principle he postulated in a sufficiently small neighborhood of a point in an arbi-
trary spacetime what holds by itself in a GH spacetime. Namely, he requires:
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The F-locality condition (Form I). Every point p in M should have an intrinsically
globally hyperbolic neighborhood Up such that, for all f, h ∈ D(Up), relation (6) holds with
△M replaced by △Up.
It is implied that a spacetime for which there is no field algebra satisfying this condition
(a “non-F-quantum compatible” spacetime) cannot arise as an approximate description of
a state of quantum gravity and must thus be considered as unphysical.
To reveal the logical structure of the F-locality condition we reformulate it analogously
to the F-locality property.
The F-locality condition (Form II). There should be such an open covering of a space-
time M by IGHNs {Uα} and a bidistribution △F on EU that
(Con1) △F matches any Uα;
(Con2) When (f, h) ∈ EU , relation (6) holds with △M replaced by △F .
An important difference between these two parts of the F-locality condition is that (Con2)
just specifies what algebra we take to be the “field algebra”, while (Con1) is a nontrivial
requirement placed from the outset upon the spacetime. It is significant that the proof of
the KRW-theorem rests upon (Con1).
The F-locality condition clearly does not fix all commutators. The value of [φ(f), φ(h)]
remains still undefined for f, h whose supports do not belong to a common Uα. It is more
important, however, to find out whether this uncertainty extends to arbitrarily small regions.
Indeed, to find such local quantities as 〈Tµν〉 (p) or, say, 〈φ2〉 (p) it would be enough to know
all commutators [φ(f), φ(h)] with functions f, h both supported in a small neighborhood V
of p. This leads us to the following question: Is it true for at least some open covering {Vα}
that
∀(f, h) ∈ EV △′F (f, h) = △F (f, h) (7)
whenever both △F and △′F satisfy (Con1) (with possibly different {Uα})? It turns out that
the answer is negative even in the simplest case. Indeed, if M is the Minkowski space and
△F is a solution of (1) satisfying (Con1), then so is △′F :
△′F (f, g) ≡ △F (f ′, g), where f ′(xµ) ≡ f(xµ) + f(xµ + aµ)
and where by aµ we denote an arbitrary constant spacelike vector field. Clearly, for any
{Vα} we can find an aµ such that (7) breaks down.
So the F-locality condition was proposed only as a necessary condition which is to be
supplemented with conditions of “the second level” to obtain a complete theory.
IV. THE PARADOX AND ITS RESOLUTION
The F-locality condition (or (Con1) to be more specific) includes actually a postulate
forbidding time machines. This follows from the Kay-Radzikowski-Wald theorem:
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The KRW theorem. If a spacetime has a time machine with the compactly generated
Cauchy horizon, then there is no extension to M of the usual field algebra on the initial
globally hyperbolic region D which satisfies the F-locality condition.
Here by “the usual field algebra” an algebra is meant where for f, h ∈ D(D) relation (6)
holds with △M replaced by △D (for the proof of the theorem and the precise definition of
D see [1].)
As is discussed in the Introduction, postulating causality without adducing a “protecting”
mechanism, one comes up against a contradiction with the usual notion of free will, which
can be regarded as a paradox.
Such a situation (when a paradox arises from postulating in the general case a condition
harmless in the GH case) is in no way strange or new.
Example: Classical pointlike particles. Consider a system of elastic classical balls. As
long as one studies only GH spacetimes one sees that the following property holds5
“The property of balls conservation”. Any Cauchy surface intersects the same number of
the world lines of the balls.
Going to arbitrary spacetimes, one finds that the evolution of a system of balls is no longer
uniquely fixed by what fixes it in the GH case. To overcome this problem (in the perfect
analogy with the F-locality condition) one could adopt the following postulate6 (note that
in the general case it is just a postulate, that is an extraneous (global) condition and not a
consequence of any other local principles accepted in the model):
“The condition of balls conservation”. Any partial Cauchy surface should intersect the same
number of the world lines of the balls.
Then one would find [6,8] that there are “non-classical compatible” spacetimes (e. g., the
Deutsch-Politzer space) that are spacetimes in which initial data (i. e., data at some partial
Cauchy surface) exist incompatible with the “Postulate of balls conservation”. This fact
constitutes an (apparent, see [8]) paradox and so one could claim that the existence of
such paradoxes suggests that time machines are prohibited [6]. On the other hand, as we
discussed above, it seems more reasonable to look for contradictions which we ourselves
could introduce in the model in the process of constructing. In doing so we would interpret
the “non-classical compatibility” of the Deutsch-Politzer spacetime as evidence not against
the realizability of this spacetime, but rather against the postulate. Indeed, abandoning this
postulate we resolve the paradox (and thus permit time machines) while causing no harm
to any known physics [8].
5A model describing such a system can be found in [8]. A specific mathematical meaning is
assigned there to the words “a world line of a ball”, etc. The property then can be proven within
this model.
6Such an approach was really developed in a number of works (e. g. see [4,6,14]).
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The above example suggests that to avoid the difficulties connected with forbidding the time
machine, which we discussed in the Introduction, it would be natural just to abandon the F-
locality condition. The problem, however, is that while we can easily abandon “the postulate
of balls conservation”, the F-locality condition seems to be based on the philosophical bias
resembling the equivalence principle, which is something one would not like to reject. So,
in the remainder of the Section we show that the F-locality condition contains actually an
arbitrary (i. e., not implied by the GH-equivalence principle or any other respectable physical
principle) global requirement and therefore can be rejected or modified without regret.
Proposition 2. For any △ and any neighborhood V there exists a connected IGHN B ⊂ V
that does not match △.
Proof. Without loss of generality (see (GH3)) V may be thought of as being an IGHN. So
either V itself is the desired neighborhood or △ V is the advanced minus retarded solution
△V on V . In the latter case we can simply adapt the proof of the KRW theorem [1] for our
needs. Namely, let B be the set from Prop. 1 and r, q the points appearing there. To obtain
a contradiction suppose that B matches △ and hence matches △ V = △V also. This would
mean, by definition, that
(△V ) B = △B, (8)
but △B(r, q) = 0 since r and q are not causally connected in B, while (△V ) B is singular
at the pair r, q (see [1] for the proof) since both of these points belong to V and are null
connected in it. Contradiction.

Thus we see that even if a spacetime is globally hyperbolic there are two families of IGHNs
for any its point: causally convex (and thus GH) sets {Gα} (let us call them “good”) and
those containing null related points that are intrinsically non-causally connected (we shall
call them “bad” and denote by {Bβ}). Both families include “arbitrarily small” sets (i. e.,
for any neighborhood V one can find both a “good” (Gα0) and a “bad” (Bβ0) subsets
of V ). Irrespective of what meaning one assigns to the term “the laws in the small”, it
seems reasonable to assume that they are the same for Bβ0 and Gα0 . The more it is so as
an observer cannot determine (by geometrical means) whether a neighborhood is “good” or
“bad” without leaving it. We have seen that the “good” sets match the commutator function,
while the “bad” ones do not. So it follows that the identity of physics in two sets does not
imply that they both match the same bidistribution. Correspondingly, the fact that the
laws in a small region coincide with any other laws does not imply that it (or any its subset)
matches the commutator function on a bigger region. So the requirement (Con1) that a point
should have a neighborhood matching a global commutator function is not an expression of
the GH-equivalence principle, but is rather an extraneous condition. It is also an essentially
global condition. Indeed, for any point one always can find a bidistribution matching some
IGHN of the point and so the main idea of (Con1) is that such a bidistribution should exist
globally.
We see thus that indeed the F-locality condition needs emendations, since while leading
to possible paradoxes it contains a strong nonjustified requirement.
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V. MODIFIED F-LOCALITY
In this Section we formulate and discuss a candidate necessary condition alternative to
the F-locality condition. Being an implementation of the GH-equivalence principle (coupled
with the locality principle, see below), it nevertheless does not forbid any causal structure
whatsoever. Thus a theory based on this condition is free from the paradoxes discussed
above, which provides further evidence in favor of the idea that the existence of time ma-
chines is inconsistent not with the equivalence principle, but only with its inadequate im-
plementation.
Consider a commutator [φ(x), φ(y)]. Physically this commutator describes the process in
which a particle created from vacuum in x annihilates in y. So when we require [as we did
in (6)] that the commutator function should vanish for non-causally connected x and y we
just implement the (most fundamental) idea that an event can affect only those events that
are connected with it by causal curves or, in other words, that particles (or information in
any other form) cannot propagate faster than light. The very same idea (called locality, or
causality, or local causality depending on the formulation and application) suggests that if
the conditions are fixed in J+(x)∩J−(y) (that is, in all points where a non-tachionic particle
propagating from x to y can find itself), then [φ(x), φ(y)] is thereby also fixed. Thus, from
locality it seems natural to require as a necessary condition that the field algebra in a globally
hyperbolic neighborhood G does not ‘feel’ whether or not there is something outside G [recall
that for any x, y ∈ G any point z ∈ M −G lies off J+(x) ∩ J−(y)]. We can then construct
a field algebra (at least on a part of M , see below) by adopting the following modification
of the F-locality condition:
The MF-locality condition. If {Gα} is the collection of all globally hyperbolic subsets of
a spacetime M , then for all (f, h) ∈ EG relation (6) should hold with △M replaced by △MF
defined to be a bidistribution on EG matching each Gα.
(In other words, we require that φ(f) and φ(h) with f and h supported on a common GHN
Gα should commute as if there were no ambient space M − Gα at all.) This condition
obviously holds in a GH spacetime, where7 △MF = △M .
Remark. In discussing the field algebra we operate with such ‘non-local’ (by their very
nature) entities as commutators [φ(x), φ(y)], where x and y can be wide apart. No wonder
that relevant statements are also formulated in ‘non-local’ terms. In particular, both the
MF-locality and the F-locality conditions distinguish some classes of IGHNs of a point from
the others. In the former case those are the causally convex neighborhoods and in the latter
case the distinguished class is not specified, but its existence is postulated. But to learn
whether or not a given IGHN belongs to the distinguished class we have to consider how it
is embedded in the ambient space and to take into account properties of this space [e. g. to
check whether or not a set V is causally convex one must consider the whole J+(V )]. In
this connection we emphasize that the MF-locality condition is not a non-local postulate
(much less a postulate contradicting locality). That is, it does not require that a spacetime,
7Generally △MF is not the same as △F . This follows directly from the non-uniqueness of △F
shown at the end of Sect. III.
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or a field algebra, possess any non-local properties. On the contrary, we found out what
locality requires in a specific situation (it is the description of this situation that necessitates
non-local terms as we argued above) and chose these requirements as a postulate of the
theory8.
The MF-locality condition differs from the F-locality condition in that
A. Some IGHN are replaced by each GHN and
B. A condition is imposed only on the field algebra, but not on the geometry of the
background spacetime.
Correspondingly, two important consequences take place:
A. As we discussed in Section III the F-locality condition does not uniquely fix the com-
mutator function. Neither does the MF-locality condition. The situation has improved,
however, in that now we can fix at least the ultraviolet behavior of the commutator function
in the region G ≡ ⋃αGα where strong causality holds.
Proposition 3. For any spacetime M with non-empty G, △MF exists and is unique.
Proof. Consider two GHNs Gi and Gk. By (GH1) their intersection is also a GHN (we can
thus denote it Gj) and points in Gj are causally related if and only if they are causally
related in Gi (and thus also in Gk). So (see [2])
(△Gi) Gj = △Gj = (△Gk) Gj ,
which means that we can define △MF by the equation
△MF Gα ≡ △Gα. (9)
This guarantees that △MF is a desired bidistribution matching all Gα. At the same time,
any functional matching them must satisfy (9), which proves the uniqueness.

B. As we discussed above, the F-locality condition is global in nature. Either △F does not
exist on M and we must exclude the whole M from consideration or △F exists and then
no region is distinguished in this sense. The situation differs greatly if we postulate the
MF-locality condition instead. On the one hand, any spacetime is allowed now (since △MF
always exists (see Prop. 3); there are no “non-MF-compatible spaces”) and, on the other
hand, different parts of a spacetime now have different status. Namely, each point p ∈ G
has a neighborhood Up such that △MF (f, h) is determined by the MF-locality condition at
least for f, h ∈ DUp. So one can develop the theory as we mentioned in the beginning of
Section III and eventually find 〈Tµν〉 (p). But this cannot be done at this stage for a point
8Note that the same situation takes place in the globally hyperbolic case. The postulate (6)
also may seem non-local since the condition defining △M contains [see (5)] a ‘non- local’ part
supp f ∩ J∓(supp g, U) = ∅.
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in (M − G), where no field algebra is fixed. Thus the surface ∂G separates the area of the
present version of semiclassical gravity from terra incognita9.
The role of ∂G is especially important in the time machine theory since it is ∂G where
the divergence of the stress-energy is expected by many authors. So it should be stressed
that physically there is nothing particular in points of ∂G (including the “base points”;
see [1]). In perfect analogy with coordinate singularities in general relativity, ∂G does not
correspond to any physical entity and the fact that we cannot find the energy density in a
point of ∂G means not that it is singular or ill-defined here but simply that we do not know
how to do this.
Remark. The MF-locality condition was proposed in this paper primarily to clarify
the relation between causality violations and the GH-equivalence principle. However, the
uniqueness proved above and the simplicity of the underlying physical assumption suggest
that perhaps it deserves a more serious consideration as a possible basis for constructing
semiclassical gravity in non-globally hyperbolic spacetimes. Then it would be interesting to
find out whether the theory proposed by Yurtsever [13] (which does not, at least explicitly,
appeal to any locality principle) is consistent with it.
9In this respect ∂G is similar to Visser’s “reliability boundary” [7]. The main difference is that the
latter conceptually bounds the region where semiclassical gravity breaks down because of quantum
gravity corrections.
13
REFERENCES
[1] B. S. Kay, M. J. Radzikowski, and R. M. Wald, Commun. Math. Phys. 183, 533 (1997).
[2] B. S. Kay, Rev. Math. Phys. Special Issue, 167 (1992).
[3] S. W. Hawking, Phys. Rev. D 46, 603 (1992).
[4] D. Deutsch, Phys. Rev. D 44, 3197 (1991).
[5] S. W. Hawking and G. F. R. Ellis The Large Scale Structure of Spacetime (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, England, 1973)
[6] S. K. Rama and S. Sen, E-print gr − qc/9410031
[7] M. Visser, Phys. Lett. B. 415, 8 (1997).
[8] S. V. Krasnikov, Phys. Rev. D 55, 3427 (1997).
[9] U. Yurtsever, Class. Quantum Grav. 8, 1127 (1991).;
S. V. Sushkov, Class. Quantum Grav. 14, 523 (1997).
[10] S. V. Krasnikov, Phys. Rev. D 54, 7322 (1996).
[11] L. H. Ford and T. A. Roman, Phys. Rev. D 53, 5496 (1996).
E. E. Flanagan and R. M. Wald, Phys. Rev. D 54, 6233 (1996).
[12] D. N. Vollick, Phys. Rev. D 56, 4720 (1997).
[13] U. Yurtsever, Class. Quantum Grav. 11, 999 (1994).
[14] H. D. Politzer, Phys. Rev. D 46, 4470 (1992).
E. V. Mikheeva and I. D. Novikov, Phys. Rev. D 47, 1432 (1993).
14
